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INTRODUCTION
On September 27, 2015, Ethan Haskell, a Content Manager at daily 
fantasy sports-giant DraftKings, inadvertently published aggregate user 
data regarding DraftKings’ biggest contest, the Millionaire Maker, before 
some of the National Football League (NFL) games in that contest had 
been played.1  The data released revealed which NFL athletes2 were the 
most popular picks among DraftKings’ users for the contest.3  Such data is 
normally not released until all of the games have started and all users’ 
lineups are finalized; viewing it early would provide someone participating 
in the contest with a huge tactical advantage:4  someone like, perhaps 
Haskell, who won $350,000 on a competing platform FanDuel for his 
fantasy NFL predictions that same week.5  This story, which received wide 
national news coverage with many allegations of “insider trading,” calls for 
broader regulation of the daily fantasy sports industry, and the start of an 
“insider trading” investigation by the New York Attorney General’s office.6
The fantasy sports industry has grown at a rapid rate, currently pulling 
in over $400 million in revenues and a 14% participation rate of the U.S. 
population.7  This paper will examine the often inadequate legal framework 
1.     Chris Grove, DraftKings Lineup Leak Rocks Daily Fantasy Sports Industry: 
Questions and Answers, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Oct. 4, 2015), 
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/4548/draftkings-data-leak-faq/ [https://perma.cc/5B8K-
9L4K].
 2.  Throughout this paper, “athlete” will be used to describe members of actual 
professional sports leagues while “participant” and “player” will be used to describe 
members of fantasy sports leagues. 
 3.  Joe Drape & Jacqueline Williams, Scandal Erupts in Unregulated World of 
Fantasy Sports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/sports/fanduel-draftkings-fantasy-employees-bet-
rivals.html [https://perma.cc/DP6L-FPA2]. 
 4.  Id.
 5.  Id.
 6.  See e.g., Grove, supra note 1 (explaining the DraftKings leak and what it means); 
Drape & Williams, supra note 3; Darren Rovell, Commissioners Say Daily Fantasy Not 
Akin to Gambling, but Needs Regulation, ESPN (Oct. 27,2015), 
http://espn.go.com/chalk/story/_/id/13983597/commishes-say-fantasy-not-gambling-needs-
regulation [https://perma.cc/D8X3-8ELD] (offering supporting opinions in favor of 
regulation and against inappropriate use of information in fantasy sports); see also Curt 
Nickisch, Fantasy Sports Industry Under Scrutiny After Insider Trading Allegations, NPR 
(Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/09/447236543/fantasy-sports-industry-under-
scrutiny-after-insider-trading-allegations [https://perma.cc/9AQ3-SB9S] (discussing the 
DraftKings leak and filings by fans of a federal class-action lawsuit alleging fraud). 
 7.  Industry Demographics, FANTASY SPORTS TRADE ASSOCIATION, http://fsta.site-
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within which fantasy sports operate and the very real liabilities to which 
millions of fantasy sports fans and service providers are currently exposed.  
Part I provides an overview of Fantasy Sports.  Part II describes the 
ultimately failed insider trading investigation.  Part III analyzes U.S. 
gambling regulation, focusing on the current litigation taking place 
between the New York Attorney General and daily fantasy sports 
operators.  Finally, Part IV offers recommendations to regulate the industry 
that better reflect societal values than the current skill-chance distinction. 
I. OVERVIEW OF FANTASY SPORTS
A. Development of Fantasy Sports: From the Halls of Academia to 
Millions of Living Rooms 
Fantasy sports originated at Harvard University in the 1960s.8  Bill 
Gamson, a social psychology research assistant, created a game for his 
friends scored on baseball statistics where each player received a $100,000 
imaginary budget to “draft” major league baseball athletes to their own 
fantasy teams.9  His game, which had a ten-dollar entry fee, became 
popular on campus, and Gamson, wanting to distance himself from 
gambling, named it “the Baseball Seminar.”10
Daniel Okrent, the generally acknowledged father of fantasy sports,11
saw his statistics professors playing the Baseball Seminar when Okrent was 
a student at the University of Michigan in 1965.12  Okrent, with the help of 
some friends, was inspired to create his own version with a similar drafting 
process but a more formalized point system that has carried over to the 
present day: players’ successes are determined by the statistics their fantasy 
teams generate in eight categories that Okrent determined to best correlate 
with success in actual baseball seasons.13  Okrent’s “Rotisserie Baseball,” 
named after the rotisserie restaurant where its rules were finalized, is the 
primary format of season-long fantasy leagues today.14  Okrent and his 
friends actually trademarked the term “Rotisserie Baseball” in hopes of 
ym.com/?page=Demographics [https://perma.cc/GNW9-HBZG] (last visited Dec. 9, 2015). 
 8.  Geoffrey Hancock, Upstaging U.S. Gaming Law: The Potential Fantasy Sports 
Quagmire and the Reality of U.S. Gaming Law, 31 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 317, 323-24 (2008-
2009).
 9.  Id.
 10.  Id.
 11.  Michael J. Thompson, Give Me $25 on Red and Derek Jeter for $26: Do Fantasy 
Sports Leagues Constitute Gambling?, 8 SPORTS LAW. J. 21, 22-24 (2001). 
 12.  Hancock, supra note 8, at 324. 
 13.  Thompson, supra note 11, at 22-24. 
 14.  Hancock, supra note 8, at 323-24. 
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someday making money from his invention.15  However, his unique name 
was quickly abandoned for the generic, free-to-the-public and catchier term 
“fantasy.”16  Now a successful Pulitzer-Prize nominated writer and editor, 
Okrent does not harbor ill feelings, and he has found recognition as the first 
person inducted into the Fantasy Sports Hall of Fame.17
Technological improvements and widespread access to the internet 
have made fantasy sports a wildly popular phenomenon.18  Before 
computers, compiling all of the necessary statistics to judge each fantasy 
team was a daunting task attractive to academics such as Gamson and 
Okrent.19  The internet brought with it websites that track these statistics 
and “host” leagues, allowing people separated geographically to play 
together and resulting in easier and more efficient access and the formation 
of more leagues, as well as greater variety amongst them.20  Today, fantasy 
sports are wildly popular; they are played by 14% of the U.S. population.21
Not surprisingly, as fantasy sports have attracted more participants, 
they have also received wide support from sports leagues, which have 
benefited from significant increases in both viewership of games and 
merchandise sales.22  That is, before fantasy sports, most people used to 
watch only their few favorite teams, while today, fantasy sports participants 
watch their fantasy teams’ athletes in games most nights of the week23  In 
addition, an ancillary market has quickly grown around fantasy sports, with 
participants spending an average of $46 a year on materials to help with the 
administration of their teams.24  Fantasy enthusiasts may also purchase 
fantasy sport insurance25 and retain the services of strategic advisers who, 
 15.  The Quaz Q&A: Daniel Okrent, JEFF PEARLMAN,
http://web.archive.org/web/20130106205742/http://www.jeffpearlman.com/the-quaz-qa-
daniel-okrent/ [https://perma.cc/3DHA-3YVH] (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
 16.  Id.
 17.  Id. Hall of Fame, FSTA, http://fsta.org/hall-of-fame/#1437065319438-f5969457-
caf2 [https://perma.cc/2GN6-38X9] (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
 18.  Thompson, supra note 11, at 23. 
 19.  Id.
 20.  Id.
 21.  Industry Demographics, FANTASY SPORTS TRADE ASSOCIATION, http://fsta.site-
ym.com/?page=Demographics [https://perma.cc/FB6G-L8X4] (last visited Dec. 9, 2015). 
 22.  See Jon Boswell, Fantasy Sports: A Game of Skill That is Implicitly Legal Under 
State Law, and Now Explicitly Legal Under Federal Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
1257, 1275 (2007-2008) (“Participation in fantasy sports leagues continues to increase the 
revenues of professional sports leagues by strengthening and expanding fan bases, 
introducing fans to teams and players from other cities, and increasing attendance.”). 
 23.  Chris Isidore, How Fantasy Sports Changed the NFL, CNN MONEY (Sept. 11, 
2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/11/news/companies/fantasy-football/ 
[https://perma.cc/4TBH-SVKB].
 24.  Industry Demographics, supra note 21. 
 25.  Leighton Hunley, Real Insurance for Fantasy Football, RISK & INSURANCE (July
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much like financial analysts, crunch all the numbers and provide 
suggestions on optimizing drafts and starting lineups.26  There is even a 
television series revolving around friends in a fantasy football league which 
aired for seven seasons.27  The entire industry has been valued at over $3 
billion annually.28
B. Traditional Fantasy Sports 
Today, fantasy leagues exist for a variety of sports at different levels, 
including professional and college football, basketball, and hockey.29
While there are many variations from game to game, “traditional fantasy 
sports” (TFS) are season-long fantasy leagues with a number of operational 
commonalities. 
Most leagues are hosted by online websites and have a 
“commissioner,” the player who is responsible for gathering each 
participant’s entry fee and enforcing the rules of the game.30  Participants 
draft their teams at the beginning of the season, aiming to select athletes 
that will perform well on a number of predetermined categories (e.g., home 
runs and stolen bases).  Participants generally construct their drafts in one 
of three ways: (1) an automated draft, where each team is automatically 
selected by a computer, (2) a round-robin/snake draft, where the last 
participant to select an athlete in one round gets to pick first in the next, or 
(3) an auction draft, where each participant receives a budget of credits 
with which to bid and athletes go to the highest bidder.31  TFS drafts are 
28, 2014), http://www.riskandinsurance.com/real-insurance-fantasy-football/ 
[https://perma.cc/2G8L-9WTL] (“[D]esigned to recover costs for owners whose players 
experience season-ruining injuries . . . [t]he coverage is intended to replace the league entry 
fee, plus research expenses such as magazine or online subscriptions . . . . [C]overage 
maximum is $1,000, including up to $250 for ancillary research expenses.  Owners can 
insure as many as five players per fantasy team and 10 players per season. . . . The premium 
per player insured ranges from 9 percent—for a historically healthy player—to 13 percent 
for an injury-prone player—of the coverage amount, plus taxes and fees.”). 
 26.  Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law: How America 
Regulates Its New National Pasttime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L 1, 24 (2012) (citations 
omitted) [hereinafter Edelman, Short Treatise].
 27.  The League, IMBD, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1480684/ 
[https://perma.cc/TVD3-5FKQ] (last visited Dec. 9, 2015). 
 28.  Nathaniel Ehrman, Out of Bounds?: A Legal Analysis of Pay-To-Play Daily 
Fantasy Sports, 22 SPORTS LAW. J. 79, 82 (Spring 2015) (internal citation omitted). 
 29.  Fantasy leagues even exist outside the sports arena, reaching as far as fantasy 
Supreme Court leagues for law enthusiasts.  FantasySCOTUS, LEXPREDICT,
https://fantasyscotus.lexpredict.com [https://perma.cc/Z6EQ-QZ4F] (last visited Nov. 29, 
2015).
 30.  Hancock, supra note 8, at 325. 
 31.  Complaint at ¶ 22, Schneiderman v. FanDuel, Inc., No. 453056/15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
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competitive: each athlete may only be drafted once and all resulting teams 
are unique.32  During the season, participants act as the managers of their 
fantasy teams and have the ability to alter their weekly lineups in response 
to events such as injuries and underperformance by benching, trading, 
dropping and adding athletes.33
There is a plethora of methodologies for effectively drafting and 
managing a fantasy league.  At the basic level, each participant attempts to 
gain points while simultaneously blocking her competitors from accruing 
points.  Ultimately, the player who is able to accumulate the most points 
wins a monetary prize (composed of the entry fees) and—often more 
importantly—bragging rights.  The majority of TFS operators garner most 
of their revenue from advertising and administrative fees.34
C. Daily Fantasy Sports: “Fantasy For the A.D.D. Generation”35
Daily fantasy sports (DFS) are the contests at the center of the current 
legal controversy.  They developed around 2009, in part to capture the 
market of millennials who think season-long leagues are too lengthy a 
commitment.36  The two main DFS platforms, and the only platforms on 
which this comment focuses, are FanDuel and Draft Kings. 
As the name suggests, their primary difference from TFS is the time 
frame: the majority of DFS games last under twenty-four hours.37  This 
short time frame relieves DFS players of the managerial role shouldered by 
their TFS counterparts because once a player drafts her team, she cannot 
alter the lineup.38  Another consequence of the short time frame is the 
Cnty. Nov. 17, 2015) [hereinafter NYAG Complaint]; Ehrman, supra note 28, at 87; 
Hancock, supra note 8, at 326. 
 32.  Id.
 33.  Hancock, supra note 8, at 326. 
 34.  NYAG Complaint, supra note 31, at ¶ 27. 
 35.  Ehrman, supra note 28, at 82 (citing Jon Bales, Here’s What It Takes To Make a 
Living Playing Fantasy Sports, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 6 2013), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-pros-play-fantasy-sports-2013-11#ixzz2kU0ZUwd1
[https://perma.cc/37CN-3EYB]. 
 36.  “We [the creators of FanDuel] thought, ‘OK, great market, lack of innovation and 
also really weird that this younger group is not coming in.  Why don’t we take something 
that people love and make it faster? . . . That was really the genesis of the idea, which is: 
How do we make every day draft day? Everybody says the best day of the year is draft day.  
That really was the product.”  Ehrman, supra note 28, at 82 (citing Erik Matuszewski, 
Fantasy Sports Luring Wall Street in Its Fastest-Growing Sector, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-
06/fantasy-sports-luring-wall-street-in-its-fastest-growing-sector [https://perma.cc/24R7-
BE6P]. 
 37.  Although some games last up to a week.  Id.
 38.  NYAG Complaint, supra note 31, at ¶ 38(b). 
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hindered accuracy of the DFS scoring system.  There are several chance 
circumstances under which the points do not accurately reflect a particular 
athlete’s game performance and thus may not accurately reflect the true 
winner of a contest.39  These circumstances include: games getting rained 
out, postponed, suspended or shortened; the sport administrators’ failure to 
correct official game statistics before the DFS platform declares a winner; 
and trades that occur after a contest is initiated.40  Such timing-based 
discrepancies can largely be avoided in season-long games and chance 
events in general have less impact when distributed over the course of the 
season.
The drafting process itself is also different.  DFS utilize a “salary cap” 
draft where each athlete is assigned a fictitious salary, which is correlated 
to how many points the DFS platform predicts the player will earn in the 
contest, and each player is given a virtual budget towards drafting her 
team.41  This aspect makes the draft uncompetitive (players do not have to 
compete with each other for draft picks since an unlimited number of 
players can draft each athlete),42 but it also gives each player more latitude 
in crafting their team unencumbered by chance events like draft pick order.  
The final major difference between DFS and TFS is the competition 
format.  In TFS, players compete against the fantasy teams of other players 
in their league.43  DFS games are structured in three ways: (1) head-to-head 
games, where two players compete against each other and there is one 
winner; (2) double-ups or 50/50, where the top scoring half of the 
contestants win prizes; and (3) Guaranteed Prize Pools (GPPs), the largest 
and most popular event where contestants can submit multiple entries and 
only the top few contestants win prizes.44
The DFS industry is the entrepreneurial sibling of the bragging-rights 
oriented TFS.  DFS are also called “Pay-to-Play” Fantasy Sports45 because 
the DFS sites directly profit from the users’ entry fees.46  Recently, TFS 
operators, seeing the success of DFS, have adopted the “pay-to-play” 
model and host season-long contests with monetary prizes.47  However, 
 39.  Id. at ¶ 58. 
 40.  Id.  Such situations are not common problems in TFS, where players have a longer 
time frame to correct any mistakes.  Also, because TFS counts all the points over the course 
of a season, one chance event will have less of an impact on a player’s ultimate score. 
 41.  How It Works, FANDUEL, https://www.fanduel.com/how-it-works 
[https://perma.cc/VJQ4-Y7Q9] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
 42.  NYAG Complaint, supra note 31, at ¶ 38. 
 43.  Ehrman, supra note 28, at 86. 
 44.  Id.
 45.  Id.
 46.  NYAG Complaint, supra note 31, at ¶ 52. 
 47.  Marc Edelman, Yahoo!, CBS, ESPN and the NIFL Are Using Pay-To-Play Fantasy 
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although TFS’ have been simplified by the internet, they are still quite 
time-consuming and not very profitable.  It would be difficult to actively 
participate in more than a handful of TFS leagues at the same time.  DFS 
have radically altered this landscape by allowing players to compete 
frequently (even multiple times in the same GPP) for up to $1 million in a 
single contest.48  A small portion of DFS players utilize highly advanced 
analytical programs and frequently wager large sums of money in order to 
profit from this system.49
Investors have taken notice of the profitability of DFS.  FanDuel and 
DraftKings, combined, raised almost $800 million in total as of October 
2015.50  The identity, or rather money and influence, of these investors is 
also significant.  DFS investors range from Google Capital to Time Warner 
Investments and NBC Sports Ventures.51  Furthermore, the very real and 
major sports leagues have also gotten in on the action.  The National 
Basketball Association, Major League Baseball, National Football 
Association, and National Hockey League have all invested and/or 
partnered with FanDuel and DraftKings.52  DFS operators have used a 
significant portion of this money to launch an aggressive advertising 
campaign with DraftKings and FanDuel reportedly airing an ad on national 
television every ninety seconds for three weeks straight.53  That publicity, 
however, has come with an unexpected price, for as one commentator has 
noted, “[i]ronically, the marketing that has raised so much awareness about 
these sites has also likely led to more scrutiny.”54  To that scrutiny and the 
ensuing NYAG investigation we now turn. 
II. FAILED INSIDER TRADING INVESTIGATION
Following the publication of the Ethan Haskell story, government 
Football to Drive Website Traffic in Fall 2014, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2014)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/08/13/yahoo-cbs-espn-and-the-nfl-adopt-
pay-to-play-fantasy-football-contests-in-2014-to-drive-user-traffic/#4cc2818f6d37
[https://perma.cc/C4CB-N92U]. 
 48.  Grove, supra note 1. 
 49.  Ed Miller & Dave Singer, For Daily Fantasy Sports Operators, the Curse of Too 
Much Skill, SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL (July 27, 2015), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/07/27/Opinion/From-the-Field-of-
Fantasy-Sports.aspx [https://perma.cc/AJD3-LT8D]. 
 50.  Davey Alba, Does Winning At Fantasy Sports Require Skill or Dumb Luck?,
WIRED (Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/10/does-winning-at-fantasy-sports-
require-skill-or-dumb-luck/ [https://perma.cc/Z787-GFGR]. 
 51.  Id.
 52.  Id.
 53.  Id.
 54.  Id.
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regulators and DFS lawyers went through the mechanical steps of a 
corporate white collar crime investigation.  As discussed in this section, 
although the investigation did not lead to criminal charges, it has raised 
questions about the integrity of the DFS industry and the adequacy of our 
existing legal and regulatory framework. 
On October 6, 2015, Kathleen McGee, Internet Bureau Chief at the 
office of the New York Attorney General (“NYAG”), sent nearly identical 
letters to the CEOs of DraftKings and FanDuel addressing “legal questions 
relating to the fairness, transparency, and security of DraftKings [and 
FanDuel] and the reliability of representations your company has made to 
customers.”  She requested a substantial amount of information, including 
“the employee handbook and company policies on how data is handled and 
whether the companies set limits on how much employees can win.”55
Both DraftKings and FanDuel retained former U.S. attorneys to head their 
investigations.56
On October 19, 2015, DraftKings released the results of their external 
independent report: Haskell obtained the non-public aggregate user data 
forty minutes after his winning lineup on FanDuel was locked in.57  This 
evidence of “innocence” fell by the wayside, however, for in just a matter 
of weeks what had started as an investigation into the integrity of FanDuel 
and DraftKings had turned into a full-out attack on the legality of the DFS 
business model, with the NYAG asserting that DFS are illegal regardless of 
whether or not there was any insider trading.58  On November 10, Eric 
Schneiderman of NYAG sent both websites cease-and-desist letters, 
accusing them of operating illegal gambling operations and telling them to 
stop taking bets from New York residents.59  By November 17, the NYAG 
filed formal criminal charges against both FanDuel and DraftKings in New 
 55.  Kat Greene, NY AG Wants Fantasy Sports Data Amid Insider Accusations,
LAW360 (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/711832/ny-ag-wants-fantasy-
sports-data-amid-insider-accusations [https://perma.cc/75UX-HM58]. 
 56.  Zachary Zagger, Scandalized Fantasy Cos. Hire Debevoise, Kirkland, Greenberg,
LAW360 (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/713126/scandalized-fantasy-cos-
hire-debevoise-kirkland-greenberg [https://perma.cc/XT5Z-SFBP]. 
 57.  DraftKings Summary of Findings, DRAFTKINGS (Oct. 19, 2015), http://pb-
cdn.draftkings.com.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/DraftKings-
Independant-Summary-of-Findings-GT-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZZ3-Q5AT]. 
 58.  See e.g., Zachary Zagger, Daily Fantasy Woes Grow As Leagues Become Targets,
LAW360 (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/730744/daily-fantasy-woes-
grow-as-leagues-become-targets [https://perma.cc/6QTN-9RJV] (reporting that the NYAG 
is trying to shut down Draft Kings Inc. and Fan Duel Inc. under the theory that they are 
illegal under state gambling laws). 
 59.  Y. Peter Kang, NY AG Deems DraftKings, FanDuel Illegal Gambling, Law360 
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/725909/ny-ag-deems-draftkings-fanduel-
illegal-gambling [https://perma.cc/N2TK-BL8U]. 
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York Supreme Court.60
It is unclear why the NYAG abandoned the inquiry into the integrity 
of fantasy sports; it may be because the legal teams of DraftKings and 
FanDuel sent over conclusive evidence of unquestionably fair conduct.  
Maybe the NYAG strategically chose to focus on the overall regulatory 
scheme instead of employee misconduct, although that would not explain 
why it dropped insider trading charges and retained fraudulent advertising 
charges.
Perhaps, the NYAG perceived insurmountable hurdles in satisfying 
the elements of traditional insider trading.  The Security Exchange 
Commission’s Rule 10b-5 (the generally applicable anti-fraud rule) is 
limited to “the purchase or sale of any security,” which would not appear to 
encompass paying to participate in a DFS Contest.61  Even if the NYAG 
could get past that initial hurdle, Rule 10b-5 has further specific 
requirements that DFS employees may not satisfy, including a showing of 
fiduciary duty, materiality and loss causation.62
While the exact reasoning of the NYAG is unclear, it is clear that any 
expectation by FanDuel and DraftKings that their cooperation with the 
NYAG’s investigation would result in their benefit was for naught.  
Instead, they are now defending the very legality of their entire business 
model. 
III. THE GAMBLING FRAMEWORK
DFS originated in only 2009,63 but are now, in 2016, “an active topic 
for lawmakers, regulators, or law enforcement officials in almost two 
dozen states.”64  Most states, including New York, utilize some version of 
the common law gambling definition, which prohibits “activities in which a 
person pays consideration—usually cash—for the opportunity to win a 
prize in a game of chance.”65  This section focuses on the litigation 
 60.  Id.
 61.  ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW
431 (Lexis Nexis 4th ed. 2013). 
 62.  Id.
 63.   Ehrman, supra note 28, at 82. 
 64.  DFS State Watch: Monitoring Daily Fantasy Sports Action in State Government,
LEGAL SPORTS REPORTER (last updated Jan. 20, 2016), 
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/dfs-state-watch/ [https://perma.cc/Y37Z-7LYL]. 
 65.  Anthony N. Cabot et al., Alex Rodriguez, A Monkey, and the Game of Scrabble: 
The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define the Legality of Game of Mixed Skill and Chance, 57
DRAKE L. REV. 383, 384 (2008-2009) (citing Darrell W. Bolen, Gambling: Historical 
Highlights and Trends and Their Implications for Contemporary Society, in GAMBLING AND 
SOCIETY 7 (William R. Eddington ed., 1976)). 
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currently taking place in New York; however similar arguments around this 
common law definition can be expected in other jurisdictions.  The federal 
gambling framework, as shown in the second part of this section, relies 
heavily on state law and unfortunately does not offer any more protection 
or predictability in the fantasy sports industry. 
A. The New York Fight 
On December 11, 2015, the NYAG got an early victory in its litigation 
against FanDuel and DraftKings: NY Supreme Court Judge Manuel J. 
Mendez granted the NYAG a preliminary injunction, ordering both 
companies to immediately shut down in New York, “finding their daily 
fantasy sports contests likely constituted gambling under state law.”66  This 
victory was short-lived, however, since the NY Appeals Court stayed the 
preliminary injunction, allowing both companies to operate as the litigation 
continues.67
DraftKings’ and FanDuel’s legal fight with the NYAG is likely to 
continue for a lengthy period of time.  There is a lot at stake for the well-
lawyered DFS operators: millions of dollars in lost potential revenue from 
customers in its largest market, New York, as well as the over $200 million 
dollars being sought by the NYAG in punitive damages and restitution.68
While the ultimate verdict on the legality of DFS is unclear, an analysis of 
New York’s gambling statutes reveals that TFS and DFS are not materially 
different activities, and they should be treated similarly.  If DFS are found 
to be gambling under New York law, the same fate should befall TFS. 
1. It is unclear whether DFS constitute illegal gambling Under New 
York Law. 
The New York Attorney General has charged FanDuel and Draft 
Kings with nine violations of New York state law in the Supreme Court of 
the State of New York’s New York County.69  The primary allegations at 
issue, on which the case hinges, are those of illegal gambling and fraud.  
Unfortunately for the NYAG, these two arguments cut against each other; 
 66.  Zachary Zagger, New York Appeals Court Halts Injunction In Daily Fantasy 
Action, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/745155/ny-appeals-court-
halts-injunction-in-daily-fantasy-action [https://perma.cc/Q9WV-XQBX]. 
 67.  Id.
 68.  Joe Drape, New York Wants Fantasy Customers Repaid, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/02/sports/revised-complaint-seeks-return-of-money-bet-
on-fantasy-sports.html [https://perma.cc/AR5A-E9LK]. 
 69.  NYAG Complaint, supra note 31, ¶¶ 115-58. 
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the first charge alleges DFS are games of chance, while the second charge 
accuses DFS operators of overstating just how much chance is involved in 
DFS.70
The New York State penal code provides definitions of “gambling” 
and its relevant parts, “something of value” and “contest of chance”: 
“Gambling.”  A person engages in gambling when he [1] stakes 
or risks something of value [2] upon the outcome of a contest of 
chance or a future contingent event not under his control or 
influence, [3] upon an agreement or understanding that he will 
receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome.71
“Something of value” means any money or property, any token, 
object or article exchangeable for money or property, or any form 
of credit or promise directly or indirectly contemplating transfer 
of money or property or of any interest therein, or involving 
extension of a service, entertainment or a privilege of playing at a 
game or scheme without charge.72
“Contest of chance” means any contest, game, gaming scheme or 
gaming devise in which the outcome depends in a material 
degree upon an element of chance, notwithstanding that skill of 
the contestants may also be a factor therein.73
TFS and DFS leagues where any money is involved74 both satisfy the 
first and third elements of this gambling statute: participants risk some 
amount of money upon the understanding that they will receive a larger 
sum of money in the event that they accumulate the largest amount of 
points in their fantasy contest.  FanDuel and DraftKings have argued that 
they do not fall within this language because players are merely paying 
“entry fees” to compete in contests for prizes.75  However, New York 
common law has consistently interpreted “something of value” broadly.  As 
the NYAG points out in its memorandum for a preliminary injunction, in 
People v. Miller, the court found that charging moviegoers the price of a 
movie ticket for the chance to win a randomly drawn cash prize fell under 
 70.  Id.
 71.  NY PENAL LAW § 225.00(2) (Consol. 2016). 
 72.  NY PENAL LAW § 225.00(6) (Consol. 2016). 
 73.  NY PENAL LAW § 225.00(1) (Consol. 2016). 
 74.  This analysis focuses on TFS leagues where money is exchanged for the sake of a 
more appropriate comparison to DFS.  However, free leagues may actually also fall under 
this broad statutory language, should a court decide that reputational advantage is 
“something of value.”  In People v. Miller, a penny was deemed something of value, albeit 
for the first factor, demonstrating how broadly the statute has been interpreted.  271 N.Y. 
44, 47, 2 N.E.2d 38, 39 (1936) (citing People v. Runge, 3 N.Y. Crime Rep. 885 (1885)). 
 75.  Memorandum of FanDuel Inc. In Opposition To Plaintiff’s Motion For a 
Preliminary Injunction at 21, Schneiderman v. FanDuel, No. 453056/15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
Cnty. Nov. 17, 2015) [hereinafter FanDuel Memo]. 
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the gambling statute.76  Movie tickets are undoubtedly entry fees and 
moviegoers “risked” very little, in comparison to DFS participants, as they 
still got to see a film with those tickets regardless of whether or not they 
won the prize.  Consequently, the defendants’ argument should fail here. 
The entire gambling charge will therefore rest on the New York 
judiciary’s interpretation of the second factor: whether DFS games are 
contests of chance.  Here, the state and the defendants disagree on the 
appropriate legal test.  The NYAG is promoting a “material element test,” 
and concludes that DFS fails because chance is a significant factor in 
determining the outcome.77  The defendants argue that a “dominating 
element test” should be employed and conclude that DFS passes because 
skill, rather than chance, is the most important factor in determining the 
outcome.78  Given the language of the statute, the NYAG’s position appears 
more convincing.  The statute defines “contest of chance” as one where the 
“outcome depends in a material degree upon an element of chance” and 
specifically points out that this provision applies even if skill of participants 
is also a factor.79
Even if the court decides to utilize the government’s proposed 
“material element test,” it is still unclear whether it will find that DFS 
constitutes gambling.  This is a frustrating characteristic of gambling 
regulations.  “[T]here’s no universal test for quantifying the distribution of 
skill and chance in outcomes of a given name.  It’s fundamentally a matter 
of opinion . . . . There’s not some simple mathematical threshold between 
‘chance’ and ‘skill’ that can help make a determination.”80  The difficulty 
in quantifying the skill involved has not stopped FanDuel and DraftKings 
from retaining experts to conduct studies purporting to demonstrate that 
skill in fact controls the outcome of DFS contests.81  Given the 
aforementioned lack of a mathematical threshold on this matter, it is 
unlikely that these expert findings will carry much weight in the ultimate 
decision. 
Both sides have put forward strong arguments as to the proper test.  
On the one hand, the short time frame of DFS certainly makes chance very 
important in some games, like where athletes score significantly higher or 
lower than their average statistics or when weather impacts scoring.  “Any 
 76.  Memorandum of Law in Further Support of the NYAG’s Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction 23-27, Schneiderman v. FanDuel, No. 453056/15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Nov. 23, 
2015) [hereinafter NYAG Memo].  See People v. Miller, 271 N.Y. 44, 48 (1936). 
 77.  Id. at 6 (citing People v. Miller, 271 N.Y. 44, 48 (1936)). 
 78.  FanDuel Memo, supra note 75, at 72. 
 79.  NY PENAL LAW § 225.00(1) (Consol. 2016) (emphasis added). 
 80.  Alba, supra note 50. 
 81.  FanDuel Memo, supra note 75, at 9 (“The Empirical Evidence”). 
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one of those factors, standing alone, can fundamentally alter the outcome of 
a DFS wager and introduce indelible and unavoidable elements of chance 
into any DFS contest.  That is particularly apparent because the margin of 
victory in a DFS contest is often measured in fractions of points.”82  On the 
other hand, the fact that chance will impact the outcome of some games 
does not make all DFS games contests of chance.  The top few percent of 
players in DFS contests win an overwhelmingly large portion of the prize 
money, which suggests that chance is certainly not the determinative 
factor—and perhaps not even a significant factor—when you analyze the 
activity as a whole.83
Ironically, this fact, which supports the legality of DFS under most 
gambling statutes, threatens to make the industry unprofitable.  DFS has 
advertised itself to look like illegal gambling because that is what will draw 
in consumers.84  As Joshua Brustein, a reporter for Bloomberg Business, 
explains:
To get to the size their investors are expecting requires a 
continuous stream of new [and unskilled] players lured by ever-
increasing prize pools with the help of muscular advertising 
campaigns.  These ads never spell out a simple truth about daily 
fantasy competitions: While any player might get lucky on the 
back of a handful of entries, over time nearly all of the prize 
money flows to a tiny elite equipped with elaborate statistical 
modeling and automated tools that can manage hundreds of 
entries at once and identify the weakest opponents.85
Various commentators have pointed out this fact in articles with titles 
like “You Aren’t Good Enough to Win Money Playing Daily Fantasy 
Sports” and “For Daily Operators, the Curse of Too Much SkilL.”  The 
NYAG’s complaint concedes that few skilled players win more often and 
actually charges DFS platforms with fraudulent conduct for 
“misrepresenting the likelihood of a casual player will win a jackpot 
 82.  NYAG Memo, supra note 76, at 9 (citing Nov. 17, 2015 Affidavit of Vanessa Ip 
Pertaining to DraftKings, Inc., No. 453054/15, D.I. 43 (“Ip DK Aff.”) ¶ 48). 
 83.  “A recent study in Sports Business Daily found that over the first half of this year’s 
Major League Baseball season, 91 percent of daily fantasy sports player profits were won by 
just 1.3 percent of the players. In fact, on average, the top 11 players paid $2 million in entry 
fees and made profits of $135,000 each while accounting for 17 percent of all entry fees.”  
Drape & Williams, supra note 3 (citing Miller & Singer, supra note 49). 
 84.  Joshua Brustein, You Aren’t Good Enough to Win Money Playing Daily Fantasy 
Football, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sep. 10, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-10/you-aren-t-good-enough-to-win-
money-playing-daily-fantasy-football [https://perma.cc/CV23-2RBD]. 
 85.  Id. at 2. 
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[sic].”86  This charge, confusingly followed by another fraud charge for 
“misrepresenting the degree of skill implicated in the games,”87 strongly 
cuts against the NYAG’s factual analysis of “contest of chance.”  The fact 
that a small number of players can consistently win prizes is not conclusive 
evidence that outcomes are determined by skill, but it is strong evidence 
that outcomes also are not determined by chance.88
2. TFS Are Materially Similar to DFS 
In its initial complaint, the NYAG argued that DFS are games of 
chance and, as such, are materially different from TFS games of skill.89  A 
comparison of the two activities reveals otherwise,-at least with regards to 
the relevant criteria on which the NYAG has relied to bring his charge.  In 
a later memorandum, the NYAG has ceased using the legality of TFS as a 
baseline argument, instead focusing on the differing roles of operators in 
each activity.  However, this distinction fails to account for the burgeoning 
market around TFS. 
The NYAG has stated that TFS are more reliant on skill for three main 
reasons: (1) longer time frame, (2) competitive drafts, and (3) the 
managerial role of participants.90  However, the season-long nature of TFS 
makes individual chance events less important, as their impact will be 
distributed amongst the statistics of many weeks.  DFS contests will be 
more impacted by singular chance events and scoring discrepancies, since 
there are fewer games in each contest.  Nevertheless, the short time frame 
actually helps DFS players be more responsive to chance events since they 
have until moments before games start to choose their lineups.  “Part of the 
skill element is trying to gauge uncertainty and use it to your advantage.”91
A DFS player can limit her exposure to speculated injuries and forecasted 
bad weather, while a TFS player will be constrained by draft-day picks. 
 86.  NYAG Complaint, supra note 31, at ¶ 144(b). 
 87.  Id. at ¶ 144(c). 
 88.  FanDuel and DraftKings argue that the consistent winners are thus evidently 
“skilled” at the DFS contests.  It may be that these top winners are misusing insider 
information, as these statistics were collected before both platforms prohibited their 
employees from participating in contests, and it is unclear what percentage of winners were 
employed by the two websites.  These suggestions are unlikely to be explored in the New 
York litigation, as a result of the failed insider trading investigation. 
 89.  Cease & Desist Letter, STATE OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/725909/ny-ag-deems-draftkings-fanduel-
illegal-gambling (click on “letter” under documents in right panel) [https://perma.cc/XAB9-
BCNA] [hereinafter Cease & Desist Letter]. 
 90.  See, NYAG Memo, supra note 76. 
 91.  Ehrman, supra note 28, at 107. 
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The competitive draft, which the NYAG argues is more indicative of 
skill, actually leaves TFS players more exposed to chance throughout the 
season.  Since each athlete can only get drafted once in a competitive draft, 
the pool of un-drafted “free-agents” is made up of low-scoring athletes.  If 
a TFS player’s top round draft picks get injured early in the season, she will 
be unable to counteract those chance events.  This demonstrates the narrow 
scope of the “managerial” role touted by the NYAG as evidence of skill in 
TFS.  Theoretically, TFS participants have the opportunity to alter their 
lineups every week but, practically, they will be forced to make limited 
changes unless they want to bet on low-scoring free-agents.  Finally, the 
short time frame of DFS also makes it harder for disinterested players to 
compete.  In TFS, someone can utilize an auto-draft or rely on a 
snake/round-robin draft to equalize everyone’s teams and then make 
minimal changes to his or her lineup each week.  In DFS, players have to 
set a brand new lineup each time they play, and the salary cap draft greatly 
expands the amount of various strategic choices they can make. 
In a later memorandum, the NYAG has backed away from its previous 
comparisons of TFS and DFS, stating that the legally relevant distinction 
rests simply on the different ways that these activities handle money.92
DFS is an activity in which the operators take a cut of the participants’ 
entry fees, much like gambling “bookies,” while TFS operators generally 
offer free or cheap, administrative fee-based, services.93  In a parenthetical 
buried in that memorandum, the NYAG reveals why this factual difference 
is significant: New York law does not prohibit social gambling.94  The 
gambling statute defines gambling broadly, but all related criminal charges 
stem from engaging in the business of gambling.  So, while TFS may fall 
under New York’s definition of gambling, no entrepreneurs have made as 
much money from it as the defendants in DFS and caught the NYAG’s 
attention as potential defendants. 
While it is true that no operator has monetized TFS to the extent that 
FanDuel and DraftKings have monetized DFS, many of the operators have 
in fact created pay-to-play contests with prizes in a format identical to that 
of FanDuel and DraftKings.95  Furthermore, the entire market of products 
 92.  Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for an Interim Stay, 36-
37, No. 453054/15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty., Dec. 22, 2015). 
 93.  Id.
 94.  “[S]ee Penal Law § 225.00(3) (exempting ‘gambl[ing] at a social game of 
chance’).” Id. at 36. 
 95.  Marc Edelman, Yahoo!, CBS, ESPN and the NIFL Are Using Pay-To-Play Fantasy 
Football to Drive Website Traffic in Fall 2014, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2014)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/08/13/yahoo-cbs-espn-and-the-nfl-adopt-
pay-to-play-fantasy-football-contests-in-2014-to-drive-user-traffic/#4cc2818f6d37
[https://perma.cc/VMG7-Y5B9]. 
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supporting TFS (for example, fantasy football insurance) is exposed to 
charges like “promoting gambling” for “profiting from unlawful gambling 
activity.”96  This distinction is not a silver bullet and only underlines how 
reliant actors in fantasy sports are dependent on prosecutorial discretion. 
B. Inadequacy of Federal Regulation 
DraftKings and FanDuel have heavily relied on a federal statute to 
justify their legality.  However, federal gambling regulations rely on state 
law definitions.97  Thus, federal law cannot save DFS from liability in New 
York or other states.  Some commentators have said Federal Law will at 
least protect fantasy sports from federal chargers where state law allows 
them to operate.98  The following analysis challenges this contention and 
identifies two federal statutes in particular that are potential sources of 
concern: the Illegal Gambling Business Act and the Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act.99
1. The Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA) of 1970 
Congress enacted the IGBA in 1970 in an effort to curb organized 
crime and target gambling operations of major proportions.100  Most 
 96.  NY PENAL LAW § 225.05 (Consol. 2016). 
 97.  Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 Overview, FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (July 30, 2010), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/fil10035a.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7JR-
479C].
 98.  Edelman, Short Treatise, supra note 26, at 95 (“The UIGEA exception for fantasy 
sports does not make fantasy sports legal because they may still violates other state or 
federal laws; it merely guarantees that the government will not prosecute fantasy sports 
under the act.”). 
 99.  This is not an exhaustive discussion of all of the relevant federal statutes but 
instead a focus on the two statutes most often referenced in media coverage of DFS.  For a 
more thorough analysis of potential legal issues for fantasy sports see Marc Edelman’s A
Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law: How America Regulates Its New National 
Pasttime. 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1 (2012). 
 100.  “The legislative history is remarkably clear that the passage of this statute was 
driven by the desire to crack down on organized crime.”  United States v. DiCristina, 726 
F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir 2013).  “While gambling may seem to most Americans to be the least 
reprehensible of all the activities of organized crime, it is gambling which provides the bulk 
of the revenues that eventually go into usurious loans, bribes of police and local officials, 
‘campaign contributions’ to politicians, the wholesale narcotics traffic, the infiltration of 
legitimate businesses, and to pay for the large stables of lawyers and accountants and 
assorted professional men who are in the hire of organized crime.”  United States v. 
DiCristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d 164, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing 115 Cong. Rec. 10,043 (Apr. 
23, 1969) (President Nixon’s Message to Congress)). 
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“kitchen table” poker games are not subject to this legislation.101  The 
IGBA does not make gambling a federal crime, nor does it even define 
gambling.  Instead, it criminalizes participating (owning, financing, 
managing or directing) in a gambling business.102  A gambling business is 
defined as one which: (1) violates state or local law; (2) involves five or 
more persons; and (3) is in continuous operation for a period in excess of 
thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.103  This 
statute provides a nonexclusive list of gambling activities, including 
bookmaking and conducting lotteries,104 and also provides a carve-out for 
“game[s] of chance” run by tax-exempt organizations.105
In 2012, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York interpreted the carve-out language to mean that the IGBA only 
prohibited games of chance.106  However, this decision was overturned by 
the Second Circuit, which held that the IGBA does not create its own 
definition of gambling, but rather relies explicitly on state law: “the 
question of whether skill or chance predominates in poker is inapposite to 
this appeal.  The language of the statute is clear that it contains only three 
requirements, all set forth in subsection (b)(1).”107
Accordingly, the application of the IGBA to fantasy sports will hinge 
on state law.  Operators of both TFS and DFS platforms would be in 
violation of this statute in states that that decide their operations are illegal 
gambling under section (b)(1)(i).  Online hosts of both activities are major 
corporations with over five employees, and therefore satisfy (b)(1)(ii).  TFS 
platforms are all “operated in excess of thirty days,” since they last the 
entirety of a sport season and DFS platforms take in significantly more than 
“$2,000 in any single day,” fulfilling the requirements of(b)(1)(iii). 
2. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) of 
2006
The UIGEA was passed as “midnight drop” legislation, attached to a 
bi-partisan and unrelated national security bill that senators could not vote 
 101.  Id.
 102.  18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1994). 
 103.  Id. §1955(b)(1). 
 104.  Id. §1955(b)(4). 
 105.  Id. §1955(e). 
 106.  See DiCristina, 886 F. Supp 2d at 235 (“Neither the text of the IGBA nor its 
legislative history demonstrate that Congress designed the statute to cover all state gambling 
offenses.  Nor does the definition of “gambling” include games, such as poker, which are 
predominated by skill.  The rule of lenity compels a narrow reading of the IGBA, and 
dismissal of defendant’s conviction.”). 
 107.  DiCristina, 726 F.3d at 100. 
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against at the last minute.108  Legislative history indicates that the bill’s 
proponents were worried about the proliferation of crime online and the 
addictiveness and accessibility of online gambling, particularly to college-
aged and underage demographics.109  Other supporters of the bill included 
legal gambling establishments that did not want to face competition, 
religious and social conservatives worried about moral decay, and 
professional sports leagues opposed to sports betting.110  Some more 
skeptical commentators posit that the UIGEA was primarily motivated by 
domestic economy concerns since off-shore online gambling operators 
were taking millions of dollars out of the U.S. economy.111
Like the IGBA, the UIGEA does not criminalize or define gambling.  
Both acts supplement existing state regulations and rely on those 
definitions.112  Both the IGBA and the UIGEA attack commercial 
gambling, but while the IGBA focuses on large scale gambling operators, 
the UIGEA attacks the mechanism by which online gambling is funded.113
The act has broad coverage: “[n]o person engaged in the business of betting 
or wagering may knowingly accept” specified financial instruments “in 
connection with the participation of another person in unlawful Internet 
gambling.”114  Unlawful internet gambling is defined as placing, receiving, 
or otherwise knowingly transmitting a bet or wager via the Internet in 
 108.  “Legislators were smart to attach a relatively controversial bill to one destined to 
ensure national security.”  Dana Gale, The Economic Incentive Behind the Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 533, 539 n.44 (2007) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 109.  Thompson, supra note 11, at 25; S. REP. NO. 106-121, at 13-16 (1999) (internal 
citations and footnotes omitted). 
 110.  Gale, supra note 108, at 545. 
 111.  Id. at 546 (“If the stated intent reflected the true motivations of legislators, the Act 
would not have carved out exceptions for specific American gambling entities.  These 
carve-outs, when combined with the absence of any articulated means for treating gambling 
problems, indicate that the Act ‘looks to be more focused on keeping gaming revenue within 
U.S. borders.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 112.  See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2182 (1978) 
(“Congress did not assimilate state gambling laws per se into the [IGBA] . . . nor did it 
define discrete acts of gambling as independent federal offenses.”) (internal citations and 
footnotes omitted); see also, Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Att’y Gen. of 
U.S., 580 F.3d 113, 116 (3d. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he [UIGEA] . . . does not itself outlaw any 
gambling activity, but rather incorporates other Federal or State law related to gambling.”) 
(internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
 113.  Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 Overview, FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (July 30, 2010), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/fil10035a.pdf [https://perma.cc/UC58-
ZT4X].
 114.  31 U.S.C. § 5363. 
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violation of some pre-existing federal, state, or tribal law.115  Both 
individuals and financial institutions may be found liable under this act.116
The UIGEA contains a carve-out for fantasy sports that was lobbied 
for by the Major League Baseball Players Association and incorporated in 
an earlier version of the bill after “extensive discussions” with groups 
including fantasy sports league interests, institutions of higher education, 
Internet service providers, the National Football League, the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association, and the National Association of Attorneys 
General.117  The news media has collectively deemed this to be conclusive 
evidence of the legality of fantasy sports.118  DFS operators have also used 
this in support of their own legality.119  Legislative history reflects that the 
fantasy sports carve-out here is a narrow one.  The Senate report on this 
amendment, for example, explicitly states that this carve-out is not intended 
to legalize fantasy sports nationally, given their highly fact-dependent 
status under state law.  The report specifically recognizes that some state 
may consider fantasy sports to be gambling.120
The carve-out operates by exempting fantasy sport games that meet 
the listed conditions from the definition of a bet or wager.121  One of these 
conditions is that “[a]ll prizes and awards offered to winning participants 
are established and made known to the participants in advance of the game 
or contest and their value is not determined by the number of participants 
or the amount of any fees paid by those participants.”122  TFS prize pools 
are almost always determined by the amount of fees paid by the 
participants.  Even if the host website collects fees, the ultimate prize is the 
remaining money that all participants contributed.  This provision is 
 115.  31 U.S.C. § 5362(10). 
 116.  See e.g., United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 729 (1st Cir. 2014) (convicting the 
defendant on ten counts of violating the UIGEA); see also 31 C.F.R. § 132.2 (clarifying 
liability for financial institutions under the UIGEA). 
 117.  S. REP. NO. 106-121, at 9 (1999). 
 118.  See e.g., Brustein, supra note 84 (“Making money from fantasy sports is perfectly 
legal.  A federal law restricting sports gambling has an exemption for games of skill, which 
fantasy games fit into.”); Drape & Williams, supra note 3. 
 119.  Playing on DraftKings Is 100% Legal in the USA, DRAFTKINGS,
https://www.draftkings.com/help/why-is-it-legal [https://perma.cc/3LJX-TXB3] (last visited 
Dec. 9, 2015); Is FanDuel Legal, FANDUEL, https://fanduel.zendesk.com/hc/en-
us/articles/210202858-Is-FanDuel-legal- [https://perma.cc/9S29-XK9F] (“Fantasy Sports is 
considered a game of skill and received a specific exemption from the 2006 Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA).”) (last visited Dec. 9, 2015). 
 120.  S. REP. NO. 106-121, at 27 (1999).  Note that this Senate report pertains to an 
earlier version of the UIGEA - the Internet Gambling Prohibition Senate Bill of 1999 - 
which did not ultimately pass.  Nevertheless, this language still holds true as the UIGEA 
ultimately hinges on state law definitions of gambling. 
 121.  31 U.S.C. § 5362((1)(A)). 
 122.  31 U.S.C. § 5362((1)(A)(I)). 
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troublesome for all TFS participants and their financial institutions.  DFS 
large tournaments, in which prizes are guaranteed, are in compliance with 
this provision, but the remainder of their games run afoul of it, a point 
made obvious by the fact that only one type of game is categorized as 
“Guaranteed Prize Pool”.123  If that labeling were not enough, FanDuel’s 
support website explains exactly how they miss the carve-out: “if the 
league is not completely filled by the start of the game then all entries on 
that league are voided and the entry fees returned to the users accounts.  
The one exception to this is the large field tournaments, where the contest 
and prize pool are typically guaranteed, regardless of the number of 
entrants.”124  Oddly enough, DFS platforms comply with the provision 
where it is most expensive to do so: “[i]f a site says it is going to offer a $1 
million prize for a tournament with a $20 entry fee, it has to pay out 
whether it attracts 60,000 players or 30,000. Falling short can be very 
expensive.”125
Another stringent and applicable condition is that “ALL winning 
outcomes” must “reflect the relative knowledge and skill of the 
participants.”126  It is unclear how courts will apply this to fantasy sports.  
TFS contains season-long managerial roles for participants, which reflect 
relative knowledge and skill.  However, TFS also allows for auto-drafting, 
which may not amount to the sufficient amount of skill.  It is likely that this 
inquiry will be highly fact-driven.  For instance, a TFS league winner who 
used an auto-draft, did not alter his or her lineup all season and ended up 
winning at the end of a football season full of surprises would be violating 
the text of this statute.  Yet, that same league may fit within the exception if 
a more active, knowledgeable participant won.  This statutory language is 
not clear enough to give the many financial participants heavily invested in 
fantasy sports confidence or guidance. 
IV. REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES
TFS and DFS are legally vulnerable because of the unpredictable 
character of gambling regulation.  The skill-chance distinction can lead to 
fifty different regulatory frameworks with further variations based on each 
particular contest.  This section examines the origins of the skill-chance 
distinction, demonstrates how poorly it matches regulators’ goals and 
 123.  Ehrman, supra note 28, at 86. 
 124.  FanDuel Support, FANDUEL, https://fanduel.zendesk.com/hc/en-
us/articles/210203578-What-happens-if-my-entry-doesn-t-get-matched-or-not-all-the-spots-
are-filled-in-a-multi-person-game- [https://perma.cc/G3P3-S3FT] (last visited Dec. 9, 2015) 
 125.  Brustein, supra note 84. 
 126.  31 U.S.C. § 5362((1)(A)(II)) (emphasis added). 
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suggests an alternative framework based on dollar amount spent per person. 
A. History of Skill-Chance Distinction 
Risk-taking has been called a “distinctively American value,” and 
gambling has not always been prohibited on our shores.127  In fact, lotteries, 
card games, horse race bets, and the like were all popular ways to raise 
money for public funds before the institution of modern tax regimes.128  For 
example, revenue from lotteries, which often acted like modern day bond-
offerings, was used to support colonial troops during the Revolutionary 
War and to improve the Erie Canal.129
Gambling, however, goes back much further than the American 
colonies.  Anthropological studies have discovered the ubiquitous presence 
of various forms of gambling in all societies during all eras of history.130
The drawing of lots, one of the oldest forms of gambling, is found 
throughout the Bible: “Moses divided land among Israel’s twelve tribes by 
choosing lots, and the Bible describes Roman soldiers casting lots for the 
robes of Christ following his crucifixion.”131  Back then, people viewed the 
outcome of such a lottery not as a mere chance occurrence but rather as the 
revelation of the will of some supernatural force or deity.132
By the nineteenth century, the outcomes of lotteries had lost the image 
of divinity for American Puritans, who began to publicly and profoundly 
disapprove of gambling.133  This disapproval centered around the perceived 
immorality of allowing individuals to gain something in exchange for 
nothing - “of earning fortune by mere chance” - in direct opposition to the 
Puritan worth ethic.134  Religious reformers continued speaking out against 
the evils of gambling and their sentiments regarding the basic distinction of 
skill and chance steadily spread amongst Christian adherents.  In 1959, 
 127.  Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals & Private Markets: Online Securities 
Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 372 (2006) 
(citation omitted). 
 128.  Id. at 394. 
 129.  Id.
 130.  Cabot, supra note 65 (citing Darrell W. Bolen, Gambling: Historical Highlights 
and Trends and Their Implications for Contemporary Society, in GAMBLING AND SOCIETY 7
(William R. Eddington ed., 1976)). 
 131.  Id. at 385 (internal citations omitted). 
 132.  Id. (citing Reuven Brenner & Gabrielle A. Brenner, Gambling Speculation: A 
Theory, A History, And a Future of Some Human Decisions 1 (1990)). 
 133.  White Paper on Daily Fantasy Sports, MASSACHUSETTS GAMING COMMISSION 11-
12 (Jan. 11, 2016), available at http://massgaming.com/wp-content/uploads/MGC-White-
Paper-on-Daily-Fantasy-Sports-1-11-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E4D-E5WY]. [hereinafter 
MA White Paper]. 
 134.  Id. at 11. 
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gambling was described at the American Baptist Convention as “the 
redistribution of a people’s wealth according to chance rather than 
according to the receiver’s contribution to society.”135
Interestingly, just as the topic of regulating fantasy sports took on 
fervor after reports of “insider trading,” gambling legislation seems to have 
made significant headway after middlemen made lotteries a profitable 
business with increasing rates of fraud.136  The skill-chance distinction, 
originating from Puritan morals, ultimately made its way into American 
legislation where it has remained through the modern day.  “A consequence 
of legislating this moral judgment has been the legal contortions of many 
forms of betting to demonstrate their reliance on skill, as opposed to 
chance.”137  FanDuel and DraftKings are not the first defendants to utilize 
this “skill” argument.  A very similar and unpredictable legal battle 
previously took place around various forms of poker, with some courts 
deeming it illegal gambling but others legal games of skill.138
B. Mismatch Between Regulatory Language and Goals 
As the prior analysis has shown, the skill-chance distinction is a poor 
regulatory tool offering little legal predictability.  Moreover, two 
hypothetical individuals help illustrate why the skill-chance distinction is 
not even the truly relevant issue in this debate: 
JANICE is an accountant who joined her office TFS league.139  She 
does not watch, or even like, sports; she joined the league for the 
chance to win money and socialize with her coworkers.  She 
picked her team using an auto-drafter, or in an arbitrary manner, 
perhaps based on the names she liked the most in a snake draft.  
 135.  Id.  Other religious leaders, for instance Elder Dallin H. Oaks of the Church of 
Latter-Day Saints, used rather more inflammatory words to highlight this distinction: 
“Whatever encourages men to take from one another without giving value in return serves 
the cause of Satan.” 
 136.  Cabot, supra note 65, at 387 (“In response to the rise in fraud and subsequent loss 
of public support, state after state began to ‘abolish lotteries and prohibited private parties 
from selling tickets.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 137.  MA White Paper, supra note 133, at 12. 
 138.  See, e.g., Cabot, supra note 65, at 401-02, n.106 (pointing out that in Massachusetts 
video poker was deemed an illegal game of chance by the federal First Circuit Court of 
Appeals, but a legal game of skill by the state Court of Appeals)(citing United States v. 
Marder, 48 F.3d 564, 569 (1st Cir. 1995); Commonwealth v. Club Caravan, Inc., 571 
N.E.2d 405, 406-07 (Mass. Appl. Ct. 1991)). 
 139.  Janice is borrowed from the character of “Janice from Accounting” from a satirical 
news show featuring a discussion of DFS. Last Week Tonight With John Oliver (Nov. 15, 
2015), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mq785nJ0FXQ 
[https://perma.cc/D68B-K3JS]. 
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Janice ends up as the winner of her league after a particularly 
surprising season; she gets to keep the $200 office pool. 
SAM is a full-time professional DFS player.140  He has degrees in 
math and economics, work experience in data science, and a 
successful history in online poker.  He spends between eight and 
fifteen hours a day working on DFS.  He has created custom-built 
predictive models and has a technique for identifying unpopular 
but effective athletes.  He plays about a 1,000 contests a week 
during NFL season and has made $2 million so far this year. 
Sam relies on skill to win and profit from DFS.  Janice has, to the 
great annoyance of her football enthusiast colleagues, won on chance.  
Janice’s league is directly violating the UIGEA.141  While it is unclear how 
Sam will be treated under New York or federal law, it is clear that he is less 
culpable than Janice under a regime that allows games of skill but not 
chance.  Yet, Sam, the objectively skilled player, is the person who is 
troublesome to regulators and commentators; Sam is being accused of 
exploiting a loophole intended for Janice.  This hypothetical scenario 
suggests that the real issue troubling regulators is not the lack of skill 
involved in DFS, but rather the presence of high-profiting middlemen, or 
the business of fantasy sports. 
C. Removing the Skill-Chance Distinction 
Our nation’s archaic gambling framework has resulted in “a public 
policy position that seems to assert that gambling is bad/illegal, except 
when it is not.”142  The NYAG has targeted DFS operators for profiting, in 
the same way some TFS operators profit, from an activity with at least the 
same amount of chance as TFS.  Lawmakers and regulators ought to 
remove the legally baseless and confusing skill-chance distinction from our 
statutes and replace it with language that better articulates societal goals.  A 
new, more accurate and sensible definition of gambling is badly needed.  
One noteworthy suggestion, from the Massachusetts Gaming Commission, 
is to define gambling as an “economy activity characterized by a payment 
by a player for an opportunity to win an award based on the outcome of a 
future event, which is not otherwise regulated.”143
 140.  Sam is an exaggerated version of Saahil Sud, who was featured in a Bloomberg 
Business article on the difficulty of winning money on DFS websites.  Brustein, supra note 
84.
 141.  31 U.S.C. § 5362((1)(A)(II) (“[A]ll winning outcomes” must “reflect the relative 
knowledge and skill of the participants.”) (emphasis added). 
 142.  MA White Paper, supra note 133, at 19. 
 143.  Id.
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Such an overhaul of our statutes nationwide will undoubtedly take a 
lengthy period of time, during which millions of fantasy sports enthusiasts 
will be left in legal limbo.  Congress could mediate this issue by enacting a 
clear and broad carve-out for fantasy sports up to a certain dollar amount 
per person, much like the IGBA left “kitchen table” poker alone but 
criminalized commercial poker providers.144  Such a statute would offer 
much needed clarity and protection to players of fantasy sports, while 
allowing individual states to regulate the business of fantasy sports as they 
see fit.  Massachusetts regulators, for example, have expressed interest in 
exploring various consumer protection measures but otherwise allowing 
large operations like FanDuel and DraftKings.145
The NYAG echoes many Americans by arguing TFS are not a 
seriously questioned activity.146  As the legal analysis section of this 
comment demonstrates, the unquestioned status of TFS is not because our 
laws make it unequivocally legal, but rather because it has been popularly 
accepted as part of American culture.  If this behavior is indeed condoned, 
Congress ought to pass a federal statute explicitly condoning it and setting 
clear parameters, rather than leaving millions of fans and a sizable part of 
our economy exposed to the whims of local prosecutors. 
CONCLUSION
Fantasy sports, particularly DFS, are a relatively new phenomenon 
that our current laws do not adequately address.  The failed New York 
Insider Trading investigation and the unclear status of TFS and DFS under 
our federal and state laws reveal that this area of social and economic 
activity requires regulatory attention.  Legislators ought to consider moving 
away from a skill-chance distinction and towards a more uniform federal 
law in order to reflect societal values accurately and provide protection and 
legal predictability to millions of Americans. 
 144.  “The intent of . . . [the IGBA] is not to bring all illegal gambling activity within the 
control of the federal government, but to deal only with illegal gambling activity of major 
proportions.” H.R. REP. 91-1549, at 53 (1970). 
 145.  See generally MA White Paper, supra note 133 (pointing out issues such as age 
verification, funds protection and game integrity as areas of concern). 
 146.  Cease & Desist Letter, supra note 89. 
